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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT OF WYOMING STATE AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES TO ORGANIZE, RECEIVE EXCLUSIVE
RECOGNITION, AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
Labor Law as we know it today in the United States is
primarily based on the National Labor Relations Act.' This
Act provides that employees shall have the right to organize,
bargain collectively and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.' However, the Act in defining employer specifically excludes employees of "the United States ... or any

State or political subdivision thereof."' The effect of this
provision is to exempt all governmental employees from the
operation of the National Labor Relations Act. Thus the
rights of public employees to organize into unions, collectively bargain, or strike are not controlled by traditional labor
statutes.
In 1961, President Kennedy by Executive Order granted
federal employees the right to join unions and to engage in
collective bargaining.4 There is no similar authority uniformly applicable to state employees; rather the organizational rights of state employees depend upon state statutes,
judicial decisions, and state and federal constitutional provisions.
Rapidly changing conditions make this an era
of turmoil in public employment labor relations.
Public demands for more and better public service
has caused enormous growth in the number of public employees and has required dramatic changes in
the nature of the jobs they perform. Old employeremployee relationships have gone, replaced by a restless search for new and better ways.'
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. 151-68 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
Id. § 152(2).
Exc. ORDER No. 10,988, 26 FED. REG. 551 (1962).
Rockefeller, Gov. Nelson A., Towards Equity and Order, TRIAL Dec./Jan.
(1969-70), at 14.
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In the absence of favorable state legislation and in some
cases in spite of such legislation, state employees are caught
in a society which has traditionally shown that it is the organized whose demands are heard and answered, yet the organizational efforts of governmental employees have been hampered at every turn. The real fear of public employee organizational efforts is that organization will lead to demands,
and when the demands are not met, a strike will result. Because we are a society highly dependent on state and municipal services, and aware that a public employee strike may halt
the operation of our public schools, garbage collection, transportation, etc., resistance to such strikes is understandable.
Refusal to recognize representatives selected by public employees, however, is hardly the way to avoid public employee strikes. In fact, it has been stated that recognition is the
second highest cause of public employee strikes,' and "legislative attempts to prohibit strikes by teachers, transit workers, sanitation men, and other public employees have just not
worked as a practical matter."' Thus, the way to minimize
the public employee strike is not to disregard the organizational movement and the demands of the organization, but to
recognize the organization, learn to work with the organization, and look for alternatives to the use of economic weapons.
"[T]he right of public employees to join or become members of labor unions is becoming increasingly recognized. '
During the three years ending in 1968 unions representing
public employees increased memberships nearly twenty-five
percent-a rate more than four times greater than the labor
movement as a whole-and accounting for roughly half of the
net gains in memberships of organized labor.' The fastest
growing labor organization in the country is the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO. 10
6. Anderson, Public Employees and Collective Bargaining: Comparative and
Local Experience, 21 N.Y.U. CONF. LABOR 451, 456 (1969).
7. Aksen, Introduction: Public Employees and Collective Bargaining, 21
N.Y.U CONF. LABOR 447, 448 (1969).
8. Am. Fed'n. of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. City of Keene,
108 N.H. 68, 227 A.2d 602, 603 (1967).
9. Rockefeller, supra note 5.
10. TRiAL Dec./Jan., (1969-70), at 10.
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It is the purpose of this article to determine the rights
of persons employed by the State of Wyoming, or political
subdivisions thereof, to organize, to have the organization
obtain exclusive recognition, and to bargain collectively under existing Wyoming legislation and federal and state constitutional provisions.
APPLICABLE WYO-MING LEGISLATION

A Wyoming statute enacted in 1933 states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State of Wyoming that workers have the right to
organize for the purpose of protecting the freedom
of labor, and of bargaining collectively with employers of labor for acceptable terms and conditions
of employment, and that in the exercise of the aforesaid rights, workers should be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents in any concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection. 1
The language of the statute refers only to workers and
it does not expressly limit the classification, workman, to a
private employee, nor does it expressly exclude public employees. The Wyoming Supreme Court has never ruled as
to the scope of the term "workman" in the statute. Although
the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that "[u]nder the
1933 statement of policy there is no exclusion of public employees," it went on to state that "nothing we say should be
construed as a decision with respect to the right of public employees" as a whole. 2
The only other significant piece of legislation in Wyoming provides that Fire Fighters have the right to organize,
to have their organization recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent and to bargain collectively. Any agreement
reached at such bargaining session is to become part of the
employment contract, and in the event no agreement can be
reached the unresolved issues are to be submitted to arbi11.

WYO. STAT. § 27-239 (1957).
12. State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 299 (Wyo. 1968).

HeinOnline -- 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 607 1970

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

tration. 3
This piece of special legislation has been held
constitutional.14
THE RIGHT OF

PUBLIC ETAPLOYEES TO ORGANIZE

The constitutional right of private employees to organize or join labor unions has been recognized for more than
In 1937, the United States Supreme Court
a century. 1
stated, "Employees have as clear a right to organize and
select their representatives for lawful purposes as the management has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents. "6
The right of state and municipal employees to organize
into unions is of more recent origin, and as yet is not universally accepted. The right of public employees to organize
and join labor organizations has been created by constitutional provision in two states, and by legislation in eighteen
states.1 7 One state has created the right to organize and join
a union by legislation at one level of government, and denied
it at another by judicial decision. Three states by legislation
specifically prohibit their employees from organizing and
joining unions. Eight other states have dealt with the problem by case law and two of these states created the right.'
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions and lower
Federal Court decisions, however, seem to hold that the right
of public employees to organize is guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. In NAACP v. Alabama," the Supreme Court stated
"It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association...
is an inseparable aspect . . . of the Fourteenth Amendment
which embraces freedom of speech.""
Recently the Seventh and Eighth Federal Circuits and a
Three Judge United States District Court for the Western
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

WYO. STAT. § 27-265 to 273 (1957).
State v. City of Laramie, supra note 12.
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 111 (1842).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
SULLIVAN, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABot LAW, § 8.3, at 31-32 (1969).
Id.

19. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20. Id. at 460.
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District of North Carolina, relying in part on NAACP v.
Alabama,2 have held that state and municipal employees have
the constitutional right to organize.2 2 The Eighth Circuit
stated "Union membership [of public employees] is protected by the right of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 8 The Seventh Circuit stated "It is
settled that teachers have the right of free association, and
unjustified interference with the teachers' associational
freedom violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... Public employment may not be subjected to
unreasonable conditions. '"" The United States District
Court held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting governmental employees from becoming members of labor organizations which is, or may become affiliated with national or
international labor organizations, and which has for its purpose collective bargaining is void on its face as an abridgement of freedom of association and is an intolerable overbreadth unnecessary for the protection of valid state interests.2"
Some jurisdictions have allowed most public employees
to organize, but have specifically disallowed certain public
employees this right."6 A 1969 Missouri case2 7 is a typical
example in holding that a statute conferring upon public
employees the right to join labor unions, but excluding police,
deputy sheriffs, highway patrolment, National Guardsmen,
and teachers does not render it unconstitutional on the basis
of an arbitrary and unconstitutional classification."
The
fear of many states, like Missouri, is that organization will
lead to strikes, and certain public employees, e.g., police,
firemen, etc., must be kept on the job. Because of this fear,
many states feel that they can recognize the right of some
21. Id.
22. Am. Fed'n. of States, County, & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Woodward,
406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th
Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. N.C.
1969).
23. Am. Fed'n. of State, County, & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Woodward,
supra note 22, at 139.
24. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, supra note 22, at 288.
25. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, supra note 22, at 1075.
26. Sullivan, supra note 17, § 8.3.
27. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W. 2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
28. Id. at 43.
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public employees to organize, while denying the right to
"important" employees. In doing this the state feels that
it has fulfilled the constitutional right of public employees to
organize, and yet has eased its fear that certain "important"
public employees will strike.
Under the federal cases previously mentioned," it would
appear that states which exclude certain public employees
from the right to organize are unconstitutional because of an
arbitrary and unconstitutional classification. The Seventh
Circuit has held that teachers cannot be denied the right to
organize.'" The United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina held the firemen have the right
to organize, and the abridgement of this right is an abridgement of freedom of association and would be an intolerable
overbreadth unnecessary for the protection of a valid state
interest. Thus an unreasonable and arbitrary classification."1
The courts in holding that the exclusion of certain employees from the right to organize is unreasonable and arbitrary have done so in recognition of the contention of many
leading authors that "[t]he right to organize and join a
union in which the public employee can participate in the decision making process is the most significant method of minimizing the possibility of a public employee strike. "2 It thus
appears that if organization lessens the chance that public
employees will strike, then any exclusion of a class of employcs based on the contention that they are more important
to the public welfare, is obviously false reasoning and no
basis for separate classification.
The Wyoming Court in a 1952 case citing Article 1, Section 2 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence stated that under the rights of Life, Liberty
and the Pursuit of Happiness, there is no logical reason for
saying that the right to belong to a union or not to belong is
excluded from this guarantee. "We think that these provi29.
30.
31.
32.

Supra note 22.
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, supra note 22.
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, supra note 22, at 1075.
Sullivan, Binding Arbitration in Public Employment Labor Disputes, 36
U. CIN. L. R. 666, 667 (1967) ; Foegen, A Qualified Right to Strike-in the
Public Interest, 18 LABOR L.J. 90 (1967).
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sions guaranty free choice in this respect to every man and no
legislative provision is necessary in that connection to further this guaranty.""
Even though this case dealt with a
private employee it has the same basic policy and constitutional statements found in more recent decisions holding that
public employees have the constitutional right to organize.
It would thus appear that if confronted with the question of
public employees' right to organize, the Wyoming Court
would follow the most recent decisions which find in favor
of organizational rights.
Let us now turn our attention to consider whether once
public employees are organized will they be allowed to bargain collectively with their employer.
THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

As previously stated, Wyoming provides by statute that
workers have the right to bargain collectively with employers
for "acceptable terms and conditions of employment." 4 The
Wyoming court has never taken a position as to whether
public employees come within the term "workers" as used
in the statute. If the court were to hold that public employees along with private employees come within the statutory term "workers" then collectively bargaining would be
available to public employee unions.
This question has occurred in several jurisdictions where,
like Wyoming, the statutory language is broad enough to include public employees. The majority of these cases have
held that unless the public employer is expressly authorized
to bargain collectively, the government cannot do so." An
Arkansas state statute states that it is the policy of Arkansas
that organized labor has the freedom to bargain collectively. 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court in construing this provision
stated, "We are unable to read into that preamble, which is
33. Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local No. 337, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d
778, 788 (1952).
34. WYo. STAT. § 27-239 (1957).
35. City of Fort Smith v. Ark. State Council 38, AFL-CIO, 433 S.W. 2d 153
(Ark. 1968); Anderson, supra note 6.
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-201 (Repl. 1960).
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merely a statement of policy expressed in the most general
terms, a specific command that municipalities engage in collective bargaining when requested to do so. Had the General
Assembly intended that change in the law it would certainly
have used more explicit language to accomplish its purpose." 37 Kansas," Nebraska, 9 and Idaho" have had cases
similar to the Arkansas decision saying that the term "employee" used in their statute does not apply to public employees.
As an extreme opposite, New Mexico 4 ' and New York4 2
have allowed collective bargaining in the absence of favorable
legislation. The New York court reasoned that the general
statutory language creating a transit authority is broad
enough to allow the city to enter into collective bargaining.
The New Mexico court, in allowing collective bargaining,
based its decision on the fact that the government was engaged in a proprietary venture, rather than a strict governmental function.4" These two decisions point to the fact that
courts have allowed collective bargaining even though there
is no favorable legislation, implying the power to bargain
collectively from the right of the governmental subdivisions
to enter into necessary contracts.
Those jurisdictions which have by judicial decision
denied public employees the right to bargain collectively
have expressed several reasons for so holding. The argument
on which they most frequently rely is that specific legislation
is needed because such bargaining would involve an improper
delegation of governmental authority to private persons.4 4
This argument seems of little merit because public employers
37. City of Fort Smith v. Ark. State Council 88, AFL-CIO, supra note 35, at
156.
38. Wichita Public Schools Employees Union, Local 513 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2,
397 P.2d 357 (1964).
39. Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 507 v. City of Hastings, 179 Neb. 455,
138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
40. Local 283 Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Robinson, 91 Idaho 445, 423 P.2d
999 (1967).
41. Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 611 v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M.
393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965).
42. Civil Service Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 N.Y.2d 866,
150 N.E.2d 705, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1958).
43. Sullivan, supra note 17, § 12.2, at 85-86.
44. City of Fort Smith v. Ark. State Council 38, AFL-CIO, supra note 35.
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do not have to agree to the union demands and the public
employer delegates no authority to the employee representative.4" The actual contract power remains with the governmental agency. The only function collective bargaining has
on the decision is by informing the employer of the demands
of the employee group, rather than each employee making
separate demands. There is no more delegation whether the
employee makes his demands known individually or through
a representative.
The Wyoming Constitution provides: "The legislature
shall not delegate to any special commissioner .. any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvements, moneys, property or effects . . . to levy taxes, or to
perform any municipal functions whatever.'"
The Wyoming Court in a recent decision has stated, "No delegation
of power is involved with respect to collective bargaining.
The city does its own bargaining and performs whatever
municipal functions are involved in this process." 7 It would
appear therefore that the Wyoming Court has recognized
that the bargaining process does not involve a delegation of
authority.
A second reason on which several courts have relied in
refusing to recognize collective bargaining is that collective
bargaining is only permissible where a state statute specifically permits bargaining with public employees."
The
Wyoming Statute does not exclude public employees, but it
does not specifically mention them in the statement of
policy that allows "workers the right to organize.'"
Even in the absence of specifically mentioning public
employees in the statute, however, the power to collectively
45.

Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IOWA L. REv. 539, 543
(1969).

46. WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 37.
47.

State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d. 295, 300

(Wyo. 1968).

48. Local 266, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393, 397 (1954) ; Fellows v.
LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547, 551 (1962); Chicago Div. of Ill.
Educ. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 76 Ill. App.2d 456,
222 N.E.2d 343 (1966); Civil Service Forum v. New York City Transit
Authority, supra note 42.
49. Wyo. STAT. § 27-239 (1957).
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bargain with employees can be implied from the authority
to contract with employees. Collective bargaining is merely a method that allows employer and employee to work out
a suitable contractual arrangement as to the terms of employment. Absent collective bargaining the agency must
still contract for employment; this impliedly means determining the wants, needs, and desires of the employees and
considering them in the contract. The bargaining process
is an adjunct to any contract and collective bargaining is
merely a method of bargaining.
A third argument relied on by some courts to refuse
collective bargaining is that collective bargaining by public
employees conflicts with the doctrine of separation of
powers between the legislature and executive branches. °
This argument can be answered by showing that there has
been a proper delegation of the authority to contract from
the legislature to the executive branch; it can then be
shown that the implied power to bargain collectively is an incident to the authority to contract. Thus no problem with
seperation of powers.
Another concept on which courts have relied to reject
collective bargaining is that such bargaining would interfere
with the states' civil service or merit systems." Even when
there is a civil service or merit system, as in Wyoming,5 2 it
does not necessarily preclude collective bargaining; it merely
limits bargaining to those areas not covered by the merit
system or within the bounds of such system. "[I]n the absence of an express statutory prohibition, a civil service system does not preclude the negotiation of collective bargaining
contracts which are consistent with the system." 3
"The most significant factor inhibiting implication of a
power to bargain collectively is the unfounded fear that the
legitimization of public employer collective bargaining will
50. Fellows v. LaTronica, supra note 48, at 550-51.
51. Local 266, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist., supra note 48; Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local 611 v. Town of Farmington, supra note 41; Civil Service Forum v.
New York City Transit Authority, supra note 42.
52. WYo. STAT. §§ 35-24, 19-121, 42-46, 42-38, 15.1-281 to -302 (1957).
53. Dole, supra note 45, at 547.
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increase the incidence of public employee strikes. Collective
bargaining and strikes do not necessarily go hand in hand.'""
"To those who believe that collective bargaining laws provoke
public employee strikes and discord, [need only] look at the
record in the states where no collective bargaining laws exist.
Recent events in Ohio, Illinois, Florida, Georgia, California,
Kansas and others would demonstrate that strikes in public
employment will occur in states that have no collective bargaining laws, as well as in those that have them."" The important question in this regard is not whether strikes will
occur, but whether the state will provide adequate facilities
to cope with labor problems, and if disagreement occurs,
whether there will be orderly procedures to deal with the
cause of the employee unrest.
Wyoming has an adequate statutory provision in which
to allow public employees to bargain collectively, if the Wyoming Court construes the term "workers" to include public
employees."
Even if the Wyoming Court refuses to find
that public employees come within the statute, it would appear that the right to collectively bargain can be implied from
the right of governmental employers to contract to hire labor.
The traditional arguments which have been used to defeat
collective bargaining by public employees, either through
statutory construction or from implication do not appear to
be valid. By viewing collective bargaining as merely a means
in which employees, through their representative, are given an
opportunity to enter into labor contract bargaining, collective
bargaining becomes merely an adjunct to the contractual
arrangement. The right of a public employee to have some
voice in the labor arrangement under which he must toil can
hardly be questioned, and the method in which he makes his
voice heard, either as an individual or by a representative,
would seem to be no real threat to the state, therefore the
means of bargaining through a representative should be recognized.
We have thus far analyzed the right of public employees
54. Id. at 549-50.
55. Anderson, supra note 6, at 453-54.
56. WYo. STAT. § 27-239 (1957).
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to organize and bargain collectively, let us now turn our attention to the question whether a public employee labor organization can become the exclusive representative of the employees when bargaining with the employer.
THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE ExCLUsIvE RECOGNITION

A labor organization that receives no form of recognition
from an employer may be no more than a social club. Recognition of any kind is an absolute essential in this relationship. The employer must visibly make his intentions known
in order to provide for any reciprocity, and not just unilateralism. "
In an early decision concerning exclusive recognition
the court refused to allow a governmental employer to exclusively recognize an employee organization. 8 Later decisions have allowed exclusive recognition at least when a majority of the employees support the recognition. The exclusive representative is required to represent all employees regardless of union membership, and employees are given assurances that exclusive representation will not preclude presentation of complaints to the public employer."
It could be argued that state Right to Work Laws prohibit exclusive recognition because no person is required to
become or remain a member of any labor organization as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment.
Professor Dole states that "the prescription of . . . the right
to work law can be satisfied by conditioning exclusive recognition on protection of the interests of employees who do not
favor exclusive recognition. "" Adequate safeguards suggested by Professor Dole include:
57. Sullivan, supra note 17, § 9.1.
58. E.g., Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44
A.2d 745 (1946).
59. Local 266, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist., supra note 48; Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n.
v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, supra note 48; Int'l. Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 611 v. Town of Farmington, supra note 41; Civil Service
Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, supra note 42; Dole, supra
note 45, at 547-48.
60. Dole, eupra note 45, at 556.
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(1) withholding exclusive recognition until there is
satisfactory evidence of at least majority employee
support for a particular representative; (2) requiring the exclusive representative to represent all of
the employees concerned regardless of union membership; and (3) guaranteeing employees the right
of presenting complaints directly to the public employer. 1
Where these conditions are present a number of decisions
have upheld the validity of the exclusive recognition at common law."2 Under this approach exclusive recognition would
not conflict with the typical Right to Work Law because the
union representative is required to represent all the employees whether they are union members or not, and any nonunion employee may present any of his complaints directly
to the governmental employer. Thus giving the individual
employee those freedoms which underlie a Right to Work
Law.
Wyoming does not have a typical Right to Work statute. 3 Wyoming's Right to Work Law specifically states
"No person is required to have any connection with ... any
labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment. "" This provision has the effect of saying that an unwilling employee cannot be forced to have any
relationship with a labor organization, and because exclusive
bargaining would result in some relationship, exclusive representation can be utilized for only those employees who want
to have such a relationship. As to private employees this
statutory provision has been held to be unconstitutional because it is not in conformity with Section 9(a) of the LaborManagement Relations Act.65 The Wyoming provision would
appear to be constitutional as to public employees because
61. Id.
62. Local 266, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist., supra note 48; Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n.
v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, supra note 48; Int'l. Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 611 v. Town of Farmington, supra note 41; Civil Service
Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, supra note 42.
63. WYO. STAT. § 27-245.1 to -245.8 (1957).
64. Id. § 27-245.5.
65. Local 415, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hansen, 400 P.2d 531 (Wyo.
1965).
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public employment is exempt from the Labor-Management
Relations Act."
The same argument could be made with respect to the
inclusion of public employees within the Wyoming Right to
Work Law as has been discussed in relation to the Wyoming
statutory provision giving "workers the right to organize
and bargain collectively." If public employees were not included within the Right to Work Law there would be a
greater possibility that the Wyoming Court would recognize
exclusive recognition for public employee organizations.
However, the Wyoming Right to Work Statute in defining
"labor organization" includes "any organization, or agency
or employee representation committee, plan or arrangement,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work."" This definition is so
broad that it would seem to include "any organization,"
whether the organization be comprised of public or private
employees, leaving public employees subject to the anti-exclusive representation provisions of the Wyoming Right to
Work Law.
It appears that only those public employees who desire to be represented by the labor organization are the only
ones that the organization can bargain for. Therefore, under
Wyoming law, as it stands today, exclusive recognition for
public employees is dead. Collective bargaining on behalf
of public employees is effective for only those who want the
labor organization to act as their agent.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming statutory provisions allowing organization
and collective bargaining are broad enough to include public
employees. If the Wyoming Court concludes that it was not
the legislative intent to allow public employees the same
66. 49 STAT. 449 (1935),as amended 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
67. Wyo. STAT. § 27-245.1 (1957).

(1964).
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rights as their private counterparts, the right of organization
is assured by the United States Constitutional provision guaranteeing the freedom of association and collective bargaining
arising by implication from the express power of contract
given to state and state subdivision administrators.
In regard to exclusive recognition it appears that the
Wyoming Right to Work Law precludes any exclusive
bargaining arrangement as to public employees.
WILLIAM L. CORBETT
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